Movement in China's money supply is shown to drive the movement in world money supply over the last twenty years. Structural shocks to G3 (U.S., Eurozone and Japan) real M2 and to China's real M2 are both large over 1996:1-2011:12. The cumulative impact of real G3 M2 shocks on real oil prices is small and statistically insignificant. In contrast, the cumulative impact of China's real M2 on the real price of crude oil is large and statistically significant. Following a sharp fall in real oil price in the last half of 2008, the cumulative impact of China's real M2 on the real price of crude oil is particularly substantial in the recovery of oil price during 2009 from a low of $41.68 for January 2009. The analysis sheds light on the causes of movement in oil prices over the last twenty five years and in assessing the relative importance of China in the upsurge of the real price of crude oil.
Introduction
The importance of oil price shocks for the functioning of the real economy is well attested. Hamilton's (1983) seminal work connecting oil price shocks with recession and economic slowdown in the U.S. has been substantiated and further investigated by Lee et al. (1995) , Hamilton (1996; 2003) and Kilian (2008a; for the U.S., and by Cologni and Manera (2009) , Kilian (2008b) , Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) and Cunado and Perez de Garcia (2005) for other countries.
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In recent years the significance of real oil prices for real activity and the high levels real oil prices have attained has led to increased interest on the determinants of movement in real oil price. This paper introduces the influence of liquidity in China and in the G3 (U.S., Eurozone and Japan) for changes in the real oil price. In the literature increases in global liquidity have been linked with increases in aggregate demand and with increases in asset and in commodity prices. 2 In parallel with analysis of the effect of rising liquidity, demand from emerging market countries is identified as an important factor influencing oil prices. Hamilton (2011) notes a 6.3% compound annual growth rate for petroleum consumption by China since 1998. 3 Kilian and Hicks (2012) This paper examines the effect of liquidity in China and in developed economies on the real oil price by building on the framework of Kilian (2009) which identifies the supply and demand side factors driving oil prices. Kilian (2002, 2004) argue that the channels through which monetary policy exerts its impact on commodity prices are expectations of stronger economic growth. 4 The analysis sheds light on the causes of movement in oil prices over the last twenty five years and in assessing the relative importance of China in the upsurge of the real price of crude oil.
Positive innovations to U.S., Japanese and Eurozone liquidity have an insignificant effect on the real oil price. In contrast, unanticipated increases in China's liquidity cause large statistically significant increases in real oil prices that persist. Results are found to be robust to a number of considerations, including whether China's real M2 continues to drive real oil price in the presence of China's real output. Incorporating countryspecific industrial production into our system does not change the finding is that the G3 real M2 has a small shock effect on oil prices, while China's real M2 has a much bigger, dominating, effect on oil prices.
Background information on China's real M2 and the real M2 of other major countries is examined in Section 2. The structural vector autoregressive model for analysis of real crude oil prices and liquidity is discussed in Section 3. Data and variables are discussed in Section 4. The empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
China M2, Global M2
The growing importance of China's money supply for is illustrated in Figure 1 . In Figure 1a the M2 money supplies in billions of U.S. dollars (USD) in China, U.S., Eurozone, Japan, the U.K.
4 Barsky and Kilian (2004) show that the substantial increase in industrial commodity prices that preceded the increase in oil prices in 1973-1974 is consistent with the view that rising demand based on increased global liquidity (measured by money growth in ten industrial economies) drove oil prices higher. Alquist et al. (2010) also discuss this thesis and confirm the Gillman and Nakov (2009) findings that monetary factors Granger cause oil prices in the post-war period up until 1997. Gillman and Nakov (2009) speculate that Chinese real demand caused the real price of oil to increase at that point onwards. Easy monetary policy has been linked to higher commodity prices in Barsky and Kilian (2002) and Frankel (2008) , although others find no empirical support for such a relationship; see, Frankel and Rose (2010) . The latter find that the oil price is determined by supply and demand for both stocks and flows of oil. The potential role for oil stocks is formally modeled by Alquist and Kilian (201) .
and Switzerland over 1996:01-2011:12 are presented. In Figure 1b the global M2 in billions of USD is shown. Global M2 is taken to be the sum of the M2 in China and in the G3. Throughout the paper we take the G3 to be the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. The rise of China's money supply as share of global money supply has been marked. In 1996 China's M2 measured in USD only account for less than 5% of global M2, however by 2011 this share increased to 28%. In terms of growth rate, China's M2 measure in USD account for 75% of the increase in global M2 registered between 1996
and 2011. For this reason, the upward trend in global M2 in Figure 1b is due to the behaviour of China's M2. Chinese M2 growth rate has driven global M2 growth since at least 2000. The behaviour of China's nominal GDP is similar to that of China's nominal M2 and is strongly upward.
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 1c . From 1996 to 2011 China's nominal GDP (in USD) increased on average by 15% per year and M2 (in USD) increased on average by 19.5% per year.
The nominal oil price and G3 M2 and China M2 are shown in Figure 1d . In Figure 1d China's M2 is strongly upward and the G3 M2 is much flatter. Nominal China's M2 trends much closer to oil prices than the G3 M2. Given these facts and the argument made by Bodenstein, Guerrieri and Kilian (2012; page 51) "… there is consensus that causality in this relationship (referring to monetary policy and oil prices) run from the event of oil market to monetary policy as well of shifts of monetary policy to the supply of oil and demand of oil in global markets", we believe that a credible hypothesis is the argument that China's expansive money supply is in part responsible for higher oil prices. The sizeable nature of China's M2 expansion relative to that of the G3 is also apparent in real terms. In Figure 1e , China's real M2 has a much stronger upward trend than the G3's real M2 (the deflator is the U.S.CPI). Based on an index of 100 in 1996, by 2011:12
China's real M2 index is 340 and the G3's real M2 index is 150.
Methodology
We use the decomposition of oil price movements into structural shocks due to Kilian (2009 
Model restrictions reflect those in Kilian (2009) , while respecting the inclusion of the monetary variables in our model. Restrictions are only imposed in the contemporaneous matrix.
These restrictions are placed using Cholesky decomposition lower triangle matrix shown in equation (3) and are motivated as follows. 5 Shocks to oil production are assumed to not respond to the other structural shocks. Oil production only depends on lags of the other variables since it will take some time for oil producer to alter production in response to the other shocks. Oil production is unlikely to respond to the other shocks within the same month.
The global real economic activity indicator responds contemporaneously to oil production shocks, because the world demand for industrial commodities could be affected immediately by, for example, an oil production shortage. However, this indicator is expected to responds with some delay to monetary variables and oil prices. The global aggregate demand for industrial commodities will not respond to money supply shocks in the same month. Innovations to the real price of oil not explained by shocks to oil supply or real aggregate demand will reflect changes in the sector specific demand for oil as opposed to changes in the demand for all industrial commodities.
The identifying restrictions in the system (3) imply that shocks to global oil production and global real aggregate demand, and the real oil price will influence real M2 in the G3 and in China,
and not the reverse. In system (3), shocks to real money supply in the G3 and in China will not influence oil supply, real aggregate demand and the real price of oil in the same month. We assume that China's M2 depends contemporaneously on G3 M2. China's M2 is substantially smaller than G3
5 For more detail about the Cholesky decomposition see Hamilton (1994; page 87) .
M2 over most of the sample and China's lenders and monetary authorities are more likely to see (at least in partial data release) contemporaneously global monetary movements (than the opposite).
To test for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, the residual serial correlation LM test and the VAR residual heteroskedasticity test are carried out. The null hypothesis of both, no serial correlation and no heteroskedasticity of the joint combinations of all error term products cannot be rejected at the 5% level (respectively). Consequently, the presence of either autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity are discarded. An important condition to be satisfied in any VAR model is that the lag structure included also has to be stationary. The inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial test shows that no root lies outside the unit circle, supporting that our models have stable roots.
Data and variables
Data are monthly data from February 1996 to December 2011 since the M2 series for China is only available from January 1996. This starting date also coincides with Hamilton's (2011) structural break analysis. The real oil price is the change in the log of the spot price of Western Texas
Intermediate (WTI) oil divided by the U.S. CPI. Following Kilian (2009) , global oil production is an endogenous variable. 6 The spot price of WTI and global oil production are obtained from the U.S. Department of Energy. Global demand for real economic activity is given by Kilian's (2009) global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates. Some of the advantages of this measure are that it is available at a monthly frequency in contrast to real GDP which is only available quarterly and it reflects global demand for commodities rather demand within one particular country. 7 G3 M2 is constructed by aggregating M2 in USD for the 3 largest economies, the United States, the Eurozone and Japan. M2 in each of the G3 is far larger than M2 in any other country over 6 Global oil production may with time respond to the other variables in the VAR as well as to geopolitical events. For example, Kilian (2008a) and Hamilton (2009) Monthly global industrial production can be constructed from International Financial Statistics (IMF). However, the aggregation of industrial production and the lack of clarity about how this index is constructed make it quite controversial as discussed by Kilian (2009 . Consequently, we take log first differences of the variables oil production, G3M2, CM2 and oil prices to avoid spurious regression results. During 2011 oil production is disrupted in Libya and there is political turmoil in several Middle Eastern countries. . 10 The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980) , where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient.
Results

The structural shocks
The impulse response effects of the structural shocks
responses of global oil production, real economic activity, the real price of oil, G3 real M2 and China's real M2 to a structural innovation in global oil production. A supply disruption significantly reduces the production of oil that is only partly offset in the first three months. The effect of an unanticipated supply disruption on global oil production is very persistent and highly significant. An unanticipated negative innovation in global oil production causes real economic activity to fall for an extended period but does not cause a significant effect on the real price of oil. A negative shock global oil production does not significantly affect China's real M2 and is associated with a decline in the real G3 M2.
In the second column of Figure 3 a positive global real activity shock has a persistent positive effect on global oil production that builds up to a level that is statistically significant over a 3 to 10 month window before levelling off. A positive global real activity shock has a persistent effect on real oil prices that builds up for several months before starting to decline and is statistically significant over the first nine months. 11 An unanticipated aggregate demand expansion has a very persistent and highly significant effect on global real economic activity that rises over time and only tends to level off after 20 months. A positive shock to global real activity has a significant negative effect on the G3 real M2 for a few months and a positive effect on China's real M2 that becomes statistically significant after seventeen months.
The effects of an oil market-specific demand shock are shown in column 3 of Figure 3 . A positive oil market-specific demand shock has a large and persistent positive effect on the real price of oil. This effect is highly statistically significant and rises in magnitude over the first three months and then falls only very slowly. Alquist and Kilian (2010) take this overshooting to be consistent with models of precautionary demand for oil in which inventories are pre-set and will not adjust 11 This result is different from the finding by Kilian (2009 Kilian ( ) for 1973 Kilian ( :1-2007 in that a positive shock to aggregate demand for all industrial commodities resulted in a significant oil price increase that builds up over the first year and then is sustained at a large value. The finding that aggregate demand for all industrial commodities has a lesser effect over 1996:1-2011:12 is not due to the inclusion of M2 variables in the SVAR. For a 3 variable SVAR along the lines of Kilian's (2009) model estimated over 1996:1-2011:12 results in a significant effect of a positive shock to aggregate demand for all industrial commodities on real oil price only over the first three months (after which the effect gradually erodes).
completely to an increase in uncertainty immediately. An oil market-specific demand shock is associated with significant positive effects on global real economic activity and global oil production. A positive oil market-specific demand shock is linked with a significant decline in G3
real M2 for about four months and a decline China's real M2 over an extended period. These findings of monetary contraction are consistent with those by Kilian and Lewis (2011) that in response to positive innovations in aggregate demand shock and oil market-specific demand there are significant and sustained increase in the federal funds rate.
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In the fifth (fourth) column are shown the responses of global oil production, real economic activity, the real price of oil, G3 real M2 and China's real M2 to a structural innovation in China's (G3) real M2. In response to an unanticipated increase in China's real M2, there are statistically significant and persistent increases in global oil production, global real economic activity and in real oil prices. G3 real M2 is not significantly affected by innovations to China's real M2. An unanticipated increase in G3 real M2 does significantly raise global real economic activity and China's real M2. These results underline the fact that for effects on real oil prices it matters where the innovation in money is originating. In contrast to the effect of innovations in China's real M2, an unanticipated increase in G3 real M2 does not significantly affect global oil production or real oil price. Over 1996:01-2011:12 an innovation in China's real M2 has significant effects on real oil price whereas an innovation in real M2 in the G3 does not.
Cumulative effect of structural shocks on real price of oil
The cumulative contribution to the real price of oil of the structural shocks to global oil production, global real aggregate demand, oil-specific demand, G3 real M2 and China's real M2 are reported in Figure 4 over 1996:01-2011:12. Figure 4 indicates that the largest cumulative contributions to real oil price movement over time are structural shocks to global real aggregate 12 Kilian and Lewis (2011) obtain these findings by adding the federal funds rate as a fourth variable to a Kilian (2009) SVAR model for the sample period is 1973.2-2008.6. Kilian and Lewis (2011) find that in response to oil supply disruption is a reduction in the federal funds rate. Fan et al. (2011) observe that the central bank of China maintains that the money supply is the main monetary tool in China, a view confirmed by the analysis in their paper.
demand, China's real M2 and oil market-specific demand shocks. The global oil production shocks are small in Figure 2 during this period. In Figure 4 the cumulative contribution of oil supply to real oil prices is also small during 1996:01-2011:12. Even though the global real aggregate demand shocks are also relatively small in figure 2 , the cumulative contribution of aggregate demand shocks on the real price of crude oil are sometimes large. This maybe because most of the aggregate demand shock come from developing economies. 
Robustness checks
Several checks of the robustness of the finding that China's M2 strongly influences oil price whereas shocks to the G3 countries' M2 do not are reported in this section.
Measures of global activity
The Kilian (2009) (and of global industrial production) is availability at a monthly frequency. This is the advantage over the use of global GDP. However, Global GDP is a much broader measure of real activity than the global demand for commodities. As an alternative specification of real activity we convert quarterly GDP for the largest four economies, the U.S., Eurozone, China and Japan into monthly GDP by interpolation of the quarterly data. Global GDP is not available on a quarterly basis, but that for the four largest economies is available at a quarterly frequency. 14 For simplicity and to be consistence with our study we aggregate and interpolate the real GDP measured in USD of the U.S.,
Eurozone, China and Japan, to proxy for the global real GDP. These economies account for around 65% of global GDP in the period studied. We substitute the interpolated real GDP of the four largest economies for Kilian's measure of global real activity. In results not reported the impulse response on oil price of one standard deviation shocks to G3 real M2 and China real M2 (with GDP of the four largest economies measuring real activity) confirm our previous finding that shocks to China's real M2 has statistically significant and persistent effects on real oil price, whereas shocks to real M2 expansion in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan do not.
Country-specific measures of economic activity
Another potential shortcoming of our model is the absence of country-specific measures of economic activity. China's economic activity could be captured by Chinese M2 and bias our results.
Does Chinese real M2 continue to drive real oil price in the presence of China's real output? To overcome this issue, we included in our model separately the industrial production of U.S., Euro Area, Japan and China as strictly exogenous variables in our system. 15 Results of this exercise of incorporating country-specific industrial production in our system do not show significant change from our previous result. The finding is that shocks to the G3 real M2 have a small shock effect on oil prices, while shocks to China's M2 have a much bigger, dominating, effect on oil prices.
Identification restrictions
Finally, we test different identification restrictions. We switch the order of the fourth and fifth variables in our SVAR system by allowing G3 monetary aggregates to depend contemporaneously of Chinese monetary aggregates. Another possible restriction scheme is to use real oil prices as the fifth variables in the system allowing monetary aggregates to affect real oil prices contemporaneously.
Both specifications yielded almost identical results with respect of our original model. The results from the robustness checks in this section are available from the authors.
Conclusion
The movement in China's money supply drives the movement in world money supply over the last twenty years. Liquidity in China and in other major countries is introduced into the Kilian Notes: Global M2 is taken to be the sum of the M2 in China and in the G3. The G3 is taken to be the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is aggregate demand shock, RP is real oil price, G3M2 is M2 of G3 countries, and CM2 is China's M2. Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is aggregate demand shock, RP is real oil price, G3M2 is M2 of G3 countries, and CM2 is China's M2. Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is aggregate demand shock, RP is real oil price, G3M2 is M2 of G3 countries, and CM2 is China's M2. Cumulative effect of CM2 on real price of crude oil
